The evidentiary concept of "privilege" protects certain types of disclosures in certain situations.

NRS 49.015 provides, generally:

49.015. Privileges recognized only as provided

1. Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Nevada, and except as provided in
this Title or Title 14 of NRS, no person has a privilege to:

(a) Refuse to be a witness;

(b) Refuse to disclose any matter;

(c) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or

(d) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any
matter or producing any object or writing.

2. This section does not:

(a) Impair any privilege created by Title 14 of NRS or by
the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure which is limited to a particular
stage of the proceeding; or

(b) Extend any such privilege to any other stage of a
proceeding.

In general, then, a privilege exists when provided for by law. Next blog we'll begin to look at the most common privileges.

As I surf around and see the proliferation of blogs I'm forced to ask myself (and occasionally others) whether anyone really reads them. There's obviously so much information out there right now, and so many different forms of media, that one must wonder who actually has the time to read blogs.

But of course people do read blogs because blogs deliver targeted information. This blog, for instance, is intended for the sole purpose of helping the public find answers to commonly asked questions about Nevada law. My goal has always been simple: deliver more substantive information on Nevada law than any other lawyer on any other site.

I'll continue to do that, and I'll continue to poach from my four Nevada legal guides (recently published and selling well - check our site at www.NevadaLegalGuides.com).

Legal professionals who use my guides now pay between $40 and $50 a book. But if you tune into my site, you will see many excerpts from my books (which took four years to compile) provided free of charge.

So keep tuning in and I'll keep providing more information on Nevada injury law than you'll find anywhere else.

And if you've seen this blog column, and have unanswered questions, simply drop me an email and I'll do my best to answer your question as quickly as possible.

Starting tomorrow I'll begin an extensive look at Nevada evidence law. See you there.

Reuters recently reported a startling statistic based upon a study by the Commonwealth Fund reported in the medical journal, Health Affairs: the United States leads Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Germany in medical errors.

Patients in the United States reported higher rates of medical errors and more disorganized doctor visits and out-of-pocket costs than people any of these developed countries. Thirty-four percent of U.S. patients received the wrong medication, improper treatment or incorrect or delayed test results during the last two years, the Commonwealth Fund found. Thirty percent of Canadian patients reported similar medical errors, followed by 27 percent of those in Australia, 25 percent in New Zealand, 23 percent in Germany and 22 percent in Britain.

Researchers, who conducted the poll between March and June, questioned adults who had experienced some kind of serious condition that required "intense" medical treatment or had been hospitalized for something other than routine pregnancy.

Patients in the United States reported the highest rate of disorganized care at doctor's offices -- 33 percent -- followed by Germany with 26 percent, Canada with 24 percent and New Zealand with 21 percent. Patients in Britain and Australia reported 19 percent. U.S. patients also stood out for shouldering more medical expenses than those in the other countries. More than half said they did not take their medicines or see a doctor because of costs.

Overall, the study reflected that shortfalls were particularly evident for people when discharged from the hospital, and for patients seeing multiple physicians.

These statistics come at a time when U.S. doctors, backed by the insurance industry, continue to argue that “frivolous” medical malpractice lawsuits create a prohibitive environment in which to practice medicine and raise the issue, once again, of whether American patients can really afford to see their rights to sue for harm done by the medical industry legislated out of existence.

Are businesses in Nevada liable when their employees assault others while on the job? The Nevada Supreme Court has never really thought so and still doesn't.

The Court recently affirmed its longstanding views in this regard in set of holdings on this issue in Wood v. Safeway, decided on October 20, 2005.

There, Jane Doe, a mentally handicapped woman, was working for Safeway Stores when she was sexually assaulted by Emilio Ronquillo-Nino, who was employed by a company that provided janitorial services at the Safeway where Doe worked. Doe, through her guardian ad litem, filed a complaint against Safeway and Ronquillo-Nino's employer, Action Cleaning, alleging five causes of action as a result of the sexual assault.

The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Safeway, determining that it was immune from suit because of coverage provided by the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA). The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning pursuant to NRS 41.745 because it was not liable for intentional torts committed by its employee and because Ronquillo-Nino’s intervening criminal acts were a superseding cause that relieved Action Cleaning of responsibility.

Nevada law has long barred employees from suing employers for injuries that arise in the course of employment. In Wood, the Court recognized that Doe's employment with Safeway brought her into contact with the assailant. While the nature of her work required her to interact with employees and the public, her specific job duties included cleaning various areas of the store and collecting shopping carts from the parking lot. Two of the sexual assaults occurred while she was collecting carts from a lot that was behind or next to the store, and the other in a cleaning supply room that was presumably in an area off limits to the public. As a result, the Court concluded that Doe's employment contributed to and increased the risk of assault beyond that of the general public. Her only contact with Ronquillo-Nino was through her employment. Because he worked as a janitor there, he was aware of the store layout and which areas of the store provided vulnerable locations. The sexual assault, reasoned the Court, was not imported into the workplace or otherwise the result of motivations peculiar to the assailant and the victim that are unrelated to the employment. Therefore, Doe's injury falls within the coverage of the NIIA, and her claims are barred by NRS 616A.020.

The Court also examined the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Action Cleaning based on the dual grounds that (a) under NRS 41.745 an employer is not liable for harm caused by the intentional torts of an employee, and (b) Ronquillo-Nino's intervening criminal act was a superseding cause that relieved Action Cleaning of liability. Doe argued against both conclusions on the basis that Ronquillo-Nino's acts were foreseeable given that Action Cleaning's workforce is highly transient, untrained, largely unsupervised, and "comprised almost entirely of" illegal aliens.

The Court disagreed. First, said the Court, Ronquillo-Nino had no prior criminal history in the United States or Mexico. Action Cleaning requires applicants to show proof of identification, checks employment references, and completes the proper Immigration and Naturalization forms for every employee. Action Cleaning's district manager further stated that he had not received complaints of sexual harassment regarding Ronquillo-Nino or any other employee in the past ten years. Under the circumstances of this case, it was therefore not reasonably foreseeable that Ronquillo-Nino would sexually assault a Safeway employee. Moreover, as noted, the assault resulted from Ronquillo-Nino's independent acts and was not within the course and scope of his employment. Consequently, under NRS 41.745, the Court found that Action Cleaning was not liable for the intentional conduct of its employee, Ronquillo-Nino and the Court similarly concluded that Ronquillo-Nino's actions were an intervening superseding act that relieves Action Cleaning of liability in this case.

Nevada is a state that protects employers and The Nevada Supreme Court's conclusion in the Wood case continues Nevada's tradition of protecting employers from the consequences of intentional harm done by their employees.